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NOTE
The Fancied Line:* Shaw v. Reno and the Chimerical
Racial Gerrymander
It has been called "ugly,"1 "grotesque," 2 "tortured," 3 "labyrinthine,"
'4
even "an offense to the sensibilities"' and a "monstrosity."6 Although its
detractors call it "political pornography, ' 7 likening it to an "angry snake," 8
a "Rorschach ink-blot test,"9 a "ketchup splash,"10 or a "bug splat,"1' its
admirers call it a "string of pearls."' 2 Whatever the applied terminology,
the enactment of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District sparked a
nationwide debate.' 3 After its 1980 redistricting was subjected to five years
of litigation,' 4 North Carolina's reconfiguration and reapportionment of its
* "Now two punctilious envoys, Thine and Mine, / Embroil the earth about a fancied line; /
And, dwelling much on right and much on wrong, / Prove how the right is chiefly with the
strong." Nicolas Boileau-Despr.aux, Satire 11, 1.141 reprinted in JOHN BAxmErT , BARTLEt's
FAmmjAR QuoTATIoNs 311 (15th ed. 1980).
1. Clarence Page, Court's Gerrymandered Justice; The Test Is, Who's Hurt By The Dis-
tricts?, SACRAMENTO BEa, July 17, 1993, at B7.
2. Martin Smith, Racial Gerrymandering, SAcRAMErO BEa, July 12, 1993, at B14.
3. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 480 (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5. Ronald Smothers, The 1992 Campaign: Congressional Races; 2 Strangely Shaped Hy-
brid Creatures Highlight North Carolina's Primary, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 1, at 28.
6. Page, supra note 1, at B7.
7. Political Pornography-ll, WAL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14.
8. Tony Mauro, Justices Look at Race Based Redistricting, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 1993, at
7A.
9. Max Boot, Supreme Court Rules That "Bizarre" Districts May Be Gerrymanders, Cams-
TIAN SCI. MONrOR, June 30, 1993, at 7.
10. Page, supra note 1, at B7.
11. Back to the Ghetto?, Tan ECONOMIST, July 10, 1993, at 13. The pundits are not alone in
characterizing the odd shape of the district. One candidate for the congressional seat noted the
narrowness of the district by claiming: "I can drive down 1-85 with both car doors open and hit
every person in the district." Page, supra note 1, at B7. The configuration of the district has even
prompted a bit of poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee."
Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes To
Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's The Only Thing"?, 14 CARwozo L. REV. 1237, 1261 n.96
(1993) (quoting interview with Professor Allan Wuffle).
12. David Van Biema, Snakes or Ladders; A Controversial Supreme Court Decision on Ra-
cial Redistricting Uncovers a Can of Worms. Or is it a string of pearls?, TImE, July 12, 1993, at
30.
13. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting; White Voters
Challenge Black Majority Map, WASH. PosT, April 20, 1993, at A4; Political Pornography-Il,
supra note 7, at A14; Smothers, supra note 5, at 28.
14. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 350 (E.D.N.C. 1984), affid in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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electoral districts became the subject of renewed judicial scrutiny that
culminated in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v.
Reno. 5 The Shaw Court encountered the problem of a gerrymandered16
district allegedly drawn along racial lines, and was thus compelled to decide
the place of such a district in the modem voting rights dialogue. 1 7 The plan
at issue in Shaw, in effect, forced a clash between the dual goals of racial
diversity in government, which some argue promotes more effective repre-
sentation of the population as a whole, and a "color-blind" society in which
the factor of race acts as neither a barrier nor a benefit to individuals or
groups. The plan also brought about a confrontation between the develop-
ment of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence and the
Court's historical treatment of voting rights litigation.
This Note first details the factual background involved in Shaw and
summarizes the Court's decision."8 It then reviews the two threads of juris-
prudence that came together to produce the Shaw Court's approach 9 and
scrutinizes the practical effects of the decision.20 Finally, the Note suggests
an alternative solution to the problems associated with reapportionment.21
The population evidenced by the 1990 Decennial Census entitled
North Carolina to an additional seat in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives.22 Consequently, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
reapportionment legislation in July 1991 to reflect the increase in the state's
15. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
16. "Gerrymander" is defined as
the process of dividing a state or other territory into the authorized civil or political
divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or
unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in
districts where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious
natural lines.
BLACK's LAW DICrioNARY 687 (6th ed. 1990). This process derives its name from Elbridge
Gerry, who, in drawing the districts for the state of Massachusetts, sought to advance the interests
of the Republican Party. Stephen E. Gottleib, Fashioning a Test for Gerrymandering, 15 J. LEols.
1, 1 n.4 (1988). The problems with gerrymandering in the United States, however, can be traced
back to the first Congress, in which "founding father" Patrick Henry tried to gerrymander future
President James Madison out of a seat. Id. at 1 n.3.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 22-54.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 55-164.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 165-235.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 236-63.
22. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives... shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers."). North Carolina's population increased from 5,881,766 to 6,628,637, mak-
ing North Carolina the tenth largest state in the country. RESEARCH DIVISION, N. C. GEN. AssErM.
BLY, REDisrlucrG 1991: LEGISLATOR'S GUImE To NoRTH CAROLINA LEoisLATrn AND
CONGRESSIONAL Rm9s-rucr No 27 (1991).
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congressional districts from eleven to twelve.' This plan included a First
District that covered much of the northeastern corner of North Carolina, and
included a majority population of black registered voters.' Because parts
of North Carolina are covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,' the
General Assembly submitted the legislature's overall reapportionment plan
for preclearance26 by the United States Attorney General.27 In late 1991,
the Attorney General formally objected to the proposed congressional dis-
tricting plan pursuant to section 5.28 Recounting that another minor-
ity-majority district could have been created and that proposals for the
creation of such a district had not been presented by the state to the public
for comment, the Attorney General concluded that the General Assembly
had declined to create a second minority-majority district for "pretextual"
reasons.
29
23. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819. North Carolina's voting-age population is approximately 78%
white, 20% black, 1% Native American and 1% other (predominantly Asian). See id. at 2820.
24. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 463.
25. The relevant part of § 5 pertains to covered states that seek to institute changes in voting
standards, practices, or procedures; these states must obtain a declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia that these changes do not "have the
purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42
U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988). The 40 North Carolina counties covered by this provision are listed in
28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (1993).
26. "Preclearance" under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered state to submit any
proposed changes to voting standards, practices, or procedures to the Attorney General. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c) (1982). If the Attorney General does not object to the proposed changes or affirma-
tively indicates that no objection will be made, the changes may be enforced without a declaratory
judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the
"purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Id.
Neither a declaratory judgment nor the satisfaction of the Attorney General as to the changes as
provided for in § 5, however, acts to bar a subsequent action to enjoin the enforcement of the
proposed changes. Id.
27. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 463.
28. Id.
29. Id. The relevant part of the letter conveying the objection reads:
"The proposed congressional plan contains one majority black congressional district
drawn in the northeastern region of the state.... mhe proposed configuration of the
district boundary lines in the south-central to southeastern part of the state appear to
minimize minority voting strength given the significant minority population in this area
of the state.... mhe state was well aware of the significant interest on the part of the
minority community in creating a second majority-minority congressional district in
North Carolina. For the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn
providing for a second majority-minority congressional district.... These alternatives,
and other variations provided in our analysis, appear to provide the minority community
with an opportunity to elect a second member of congress of their choice to office, but,
despite this fact, such configuration for a second majority-minority congressional dis-
trict was dismissed for what appears to be pretextual reasons. Therefore, on behalf of
the Attorney General, I must object to the 1991 redistricting for the North Carolina
[Congressional plan].
Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare B. Smiley,
Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991).
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In response to the objection of the Attorney General, the General As-
sembly enacted a second plan3" that created a second minority-majority dis-
trict.3 1 This district, the Twelfth, was not in the southeastern part of the
state, as the Attorney General had suggested, but along a narrow strip some
160 miles long in the north-central Piedmont area.3 2 This plan divided
counties, cities, and even precincts among two or three congressional dis-
tricts.33 The Attorney General did not object to the revised plan. 4
Five white registered voters from Durham County then brought an ac-
tion against both state and federal officials seeking a permanent injunction
to bar implementation of the approved plan. 5 The plaintiffs claimed that
the North Carolina legislature "created two Congressional Districts in
which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily... with the
purpose to create Congressional districts along racial lines and to assure the
election of two black representatives to Congress. 36 The plaintiffs argued
that the creation of these districts constituted unconstitutional racial gerry-
manders that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The three-judge dis-
30. See Appendix A for a diagram of the North Carolina plan and Appendix B for a diagram
of the Twelfth District.
31. Act of Jan. 24, 1992; ch. 7; 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws 77. A minority-majority district
is one in which blacks, Latinos, or other minorities, compose a majority of voters. Lynne Duke,
Advocates Say Justices Muddy Voting Rights; Decision in North Carolina Congressional Redis-
tricting Case Criticized as 'Utopianism,' WASH. PosT, June 30, 1993, at A8.
32. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 464.
33. Id.
34. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821. The Republican Party of North Carolina and others instituted
an action prior to the Shaw suit, claiming that the plan was a political gerrymander designed to
protect incumbents. The suit was dismissed by the district court, and the dismissal was summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392,394 (W.D.N.C. 1992), affd, 113
S. Ct. 30 (1992).
35. Id. The fact that the plaintiffs in Shaw were white was not part of the complaint. In
describing the injury allegedly caused by the North Carolina plan, the plaintiffs asserted that the
injury was suffered by "all ... citizens and registered voters of North Carolina-whether black,
white, native-American, or others." Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 St. Ct. 2816 (1993).
The majority did not directly address the issue of the Shaw plaintiffs's standing to bring this
type of equal protection claim, and this issue is not addressed in this Note. For a discussion of the
standing issue in Shaw, see Richard H. Pildesand & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi-
zarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 lc. L. Rav. 483, 513-16 (1993).
36. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). The First District contains a 53.40% black voting
age population and 52.41% black registered voters. The Twelfth District contains a 53.34% black
voting age population and 54.71% black registered voters. Brief for Appellees at 7 n.6, Shaw (No.
92-357).
37. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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trict court dismissed the claim.3" The Supreme Court granted certiorari 39 to
determine
[w]hether a state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting
Rights Act and the Attorney General's interpretation thereof pre-
cludes a finding that the legislature's congressional redistricting
plan was adopted with invidious discriminatory intent where the
legislature did not accede to the plan suggested by the Attorney
General but instead developed its own.'
In considering the appellants' claim that the reapportionment plan cre-
ated an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority,4 examined the Court's prior treatment of racial classifica-
tions.42 Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court has previously held that, whether express or implied, racial classi-
fications are "suspect" and demand "searching judicial inquiry" to deter-
mine whether a "purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's
supposed beneficiaries. '43 Applying this concept to the process of reappor-
38. The district court held that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the federal defend-
ants, as the District Court for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunc-
tions against the execution of the Voting Rights Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers
in that context. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 466-67 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b)
(1982)). Two of the judges also concluded that the federal claim, to the extent that it questioned
the Attorney General's preclearance decisions, was foreclosed by Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S.
491,505-07 (1977), which held that the Attorney General's actions in these matters are not subject
to judicial review. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 467.
By a two-to-one vote, the district court also dismissed the claim against the state defendants,
ruling that the North Carolina redistricting scheme did not violate the rights of white voters, as it
was not "adopted with the purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters ... on ac-
count of their race" as required in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 165-68 (1977) (plurality opinion). Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 472. Chief Judge Voor-
hees dissented, however, and argued that the failure of the North Carolina legislature to follow
"[time honored constitutional concepts of districting" such as compactness and contiguity in the
reapportionment plan "augur[ed] a constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent" and,
as such, was sufficient to surmount the state defendants' motion to dismiss. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at
476-77.
39. 113 S. Ct. 653 (1993). Cases heard under the Voting Rights Act are heard by a special
three-judge district court, and appeals lie with the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988).
40. Brief for Appellants at 4, Shaw (No. 92-357).
41. Ironically, Justice O'Connor is the only member of the Court who has dealt with redis-
tricting from a legislative viewpoint; she served in the Arizona legislature during that state's 1972
reapportionment. Susan B. Glasser, Who's Next? Black, Hispanic Members Fear Lawsuits After
Court's N.C. Ruling, RoLL CALL, July 1, 1993, at 1, 18. She served in the Arizona legislature
from 1969 to 1974, and as the majority leader of the Arizona State Senate from 1973 to 1974. B.
Drummond Ayres, Jr., Woman in the News: "A Reputation for Excelling," N.Y. TImins, July 8,
1981, at Al. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy constituted the
remainder of the majority.
42. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-28.
43. Id. at 2824 (quotations and citations omitted).
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tionment, the majority concluded that any plan that separates individuals
based merely on racial considerations too closely resembles "political
apartheid."' 4 The majority reasoned that such a plan may reinforce the per-
ception that individuals of the same racial group think alike and share the
same interests, thereby perpetuating "impermissible racial stereotypes."'45
Where such a reapportionment plan is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race,"46 the Court concluded that the "strict scrutiny"'4 7 test used to evaluate
state laws that classify citizens by race should be applied to determine its
constitutionality.4"
Because it had rejected such racial distinctions in other contexts,49 the
Court held by a five-to-four vote that a reapportionment plan which was "so
irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate
voters into separate voting districts because of their race" constituted proper
foundation for a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.5" Although the
four dissenters5 maintained that the irregular shape of the district, because
it was not indicative of an invidiously discriminatory purpose or effect, did
not provide the basis for such a claim, 2 the majority concluded that "ap-
pearances do matter"53 in the reapportionment context. The Court thus re-
manded the case to the district court and required the state to prove that it
has a "compelling governmental interest" in the reapportionment plan and
that the plan is "narrowly tailored" to fit that interest.54
The Shaw decision results from the convergence of two previously dis-
crete lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence: the judicial interpretation of
the right to vote, pursuant to the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act,
44. Id. at 2827.
45. Id. (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)).
46. Id. at 2825 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977)).
47. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989): In Croson, the
Court stated that strict scrutiny is used to
"smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect classification. [Strict scru-
tiny] also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there
is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.
Il
48. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
49. See infra notes 54-88.
50. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
51. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2843
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2840-42 (White, J. dissenting); id. at 2843-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
2848-49 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2827.
54. Id. at 2832.
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and the scrutiny given racial classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause.
After the courts succeeded in striking down laws that were aimed at
preventing blacks and other minorities from exercising the right to vote,55
the Court turned its focus to more subtle discriminatory practices. Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoots6 was one of the first cases that dealt with reapportionment
schemes and the issue of race, and it may have foreshadowed the contro-
versy at issue in Shaw. Gomillion involved the Alabama legislature's redef-
inition of the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee from a square-shaped
figure to a twenty-eight sided form.5 7 The Gomillion plaintiffs alleged that
this redefinition, which removed all but a handful of the city's 400 blacks
from within the city's boundaries, violated their constitutional rights.5" The
Court held that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove their
allegations. If true, these assertions would show that the redesignation "was
not an ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar
abuses of gerrymandering"5 9 and that this process of "fencing out,' deprived
black voters of their right to vote.' The Court further refined this idea in
Wright v. Rockefeller.6 In Wright, the plaintiffs brought suit claiming that
the 1961 New York congressional districting plan was drawn "with racial
considerations in mind," creating racially segregated districts in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.62 The Court upheld the district
court's finding that irregular districts drawn largely on racial lines did not
violate the Constitution so long as they were not "the product of a state
contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin."63
The Court again confronted the issue of Alabama's reapportionment,
albeit in a different context, in Reynolds v. Sims.' 4 The Reynolds plaintiffs
claimed that their votes were being "diluted" in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment through the apportionment of the Alabama legislature; the leg-
islative districts had not been reapportioned in sixty years and contained
gross population disparities.65 Extending the concept established in Baker
v. Carr66 that an equal protection challenge to the constitutionality of ap-
55. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1965).
56. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
57. Id. at 340.
58. Id. at 340-41. Only four or five of the city's black citizens remained within the city after
the boundaries were redrawn. Id.
59. Id. at 341.
60. Id. at 341, 345.
61. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
62. Id. at 54.
63. Id. at 58.
64. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
65. Id. at 538-40.
66. 369 U.S. 186, 209, 237 (1962).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
portionment of a legislature based on dilution was justiciable, the Wright
Court held that state legislative districts must be apportioned in such a man-
ner that each district contains an equivalent number of people.' This be-
came known as the "one person, one vote" principle.6
8
While "one person, one vote" may have reflected a dedication to
equality in the district population of reapportionment plans, it did not repre-
sent the practical realities of the time regarding the right to vote, as many
states employed literacy tests and other devices to discriminate against
black voters. 69  After several unsuccessful attempts to remedy these
problems,7' Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965,71 which, rather
than dealing with discrimination on a case-by-case basis, operated in a pre-
ventative manner by shifting the "advantage of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil to its victims. 72
The Voting Rights Act effectively combatted the more blatant mani-
festations of discrimination in voting,73 but the reapportionment process re-
mained a significant area of controversy. The concepts of racial
discrimination and vote dilution appeared again in Whitcomb v. ChaviS.7 4
Whitcomb involved a multimember district75 encompassing Marion County,
Indiana, which held at-large elections76 for both state senators and repre-
sentatives. The Whitcomb plaintiffs claimed that the districting plan diluted
the strength of black voters and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.7 The Court recognized that a claim challenging the constitutional-
ity of a multimember districting plan is justiciable when the circumstances
"operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population. 78 The Court noted the difference, how-
ever, between a group's candidates being defeated at the polls and that
67. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. The Court extended this notion to congressional districts in
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
68. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823. Justice Harlan actually coined the phrase "one man, one vote"
in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 856 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311-12 (1966).
70. Id. at 312-15 (describing the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964).
71. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
72. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
73. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823 ("The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial
minorities access to the voting booth ...
74. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
75. A multimember district is one in which two or more representatives are elected from one
district. Id. at 127-28.
76. An at-large election is one in which a number of representatives are chosen by the entire
population of a county, state, or other subdivision, rather than being separated into different dis-
tricts. BLAcK's LAW DiCnONARY 125 (6th ed. 1990).
77. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 128-29.
78. Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
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group being denied equal participation in the process, and found that the
Equal Protection Clause was not violated where members of a group had
equal access and equal opportunity to participate in the political process-
even where the group's candidates lost in elections in "safe" districts where
the same individuals or parties won consistently. 9 Although these effects
were absent in Whitcomb, the Court found them to be prevalent in White v.
Regester.80 Applying a "totality of the circumstances"'" test, the Court con-
cluded that the multimember district in question "invidiously excluded
Mexican-Americans from effective participation in political life." 2 The
Court upheld the invalidation of the plan. 3
In Beer v. United States,"4 the Court shifted its analysis by examining
the mathematical aspects of a redistricting plan. The plan at issue, dividing
New Orleans into city council districts, contained three districts with a ma-
jority of black residents, one of which contained a majority of black regis-
tered voters.8 5 The district court found that the plan did have the effect of
abridging the right to vote on account of race, as there was a great differ-
ence between the potential for blacks, based on their population in the city,
to elect their candidates of choice and the probable outcome of the elec-
tions, based on the way in which the districts were drawn. 6 In overturning
the judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court held that the reapportionment plan
actually enhanced the position of black voters, as it would result in an in-
crease in black representation on the council, and therefore could not have
the effect of diluting the right to vote based on racial considerations as
defined in the Voting Rights Act.8" According to the Court, the Act was
intended to "insure that (the gains thus far achieved in minority political
participation) shall not be destroyed through new (discriminatory) proce-
dures and techniques."88 The Court further stated that section 5 prevented
"retrogression[s] in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise."8 9 Although the Court held in
Beer that a change in voting that did not have a retrogressive effect on the
position of minority voters did not violate the Voting Rights Act,9" Justice
Marshall observed that it did so while disregarding the issues of discrimina-
79. Id. at 153.
80. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
81. Id. at 769.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 769-70.
84. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
85. Id. at 136-37.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 141-42.
88. Id. at 140-41 (citing S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975)).
89. Id. at 141.
90. Id.
1994]
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tory intent and effect that had been the paramount concerns in the Court's
previous voting rights jurisprudence.91
The Court again confronted the issues of race and reapportionment in
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey. 2 The
United Jewish Organizations plaintiffs, members of a Hasidic Jewish
group, claimed that the districting plan for Kings County, New York uncon-
stitutionally diluted their voting strength and that they were assigned to dis-
tricts based upon purely racial considerations.93 In affirming the court of
appeals, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not
prevent a state subject to the Voting Rights Act from "deliberately creating
... black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reappor-
tionment plan complies with § 5 [of the Act]."'9 4 Although the plan used
racial considerations in establishing the districts, it "represented no slur or
stigma with respect to whites or any other race."'95 The Court reasoned that
because there had been no "fencing out" of whites from political participa-
tion, and the scheme had not reduced white voting strength, the New York
plan did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.96
The Court instituted a different approach to its evaluation of claims of
vote dilution in City of Mobile v. Bolden.97 In Bolden, the Court held that
violations of the Equal Protection Clause occur only where there is pur-
poseful discrimination. Stating "the basic equal protection principle that the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ulti-
mately be traced to an ultimately discriminatory purpose," 98 a plurality of
the Court held that the at-large multimember district of the City of Mobile
did not violate the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Be-
cause the Court previously had held that the racially disproportionate im-
pact of a state program is insufficient on its own to render an action
unconstitutional," ° the plurality thought that it would be inconsistent to
conclude that an action could constitute discrimination absent a showing of
discriminatory intent."0 In Rogers v. Lodge,"°2 however, the Court deter-
91. Id. at 145-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
93. Id. at 152-53 (plurality opinion).
94. Id. at 161 (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 165 (plurality opinion).
96. Id. (plurality opinion).
97. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
98. Id. at 69 (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
99. Id. at 60-61, 65, 74 (plurality opinion).
100. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (holding that a program is not
unconstitutional solely due to discriminatory impact in the absence of a discriminatory purpose);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1976) (requiring
proof of a discriminatory purpose to show a violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
101, Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72-73.
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mined that "'an invidiously discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if... true, that the
law bears more heavily on one race than another.' "103 Indeed, these cases
signalled the Court's initial movement toward integrating its racial classifi-
cation and voting rights jurisprudence.
The Court's decision in Bolden prompted Congress to amend section 2
of the Voting Rights Act to provide that a discriminatory effect alone could
establish a violation of the Act."° Furthermore, the amendment authorized
the "results" test which provided that a showing that members of a group
within a district had less opportunity to participate in the political process
than did other members of the district would constitute a violation of the
Act.'0 5 The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report accompanying the
proposed changes to section 2 listed several "typical factors" that might
indicate a violation of this section."°  A "totality of the circumstances' 10 7
test was provided in the revised section 2.108
102. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
103. Id. at 618 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 242).
104. Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984).
105. The "results" test was set forth by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
766 (1973), and was applied by other federal courts prior to the Bolden decision. See, e.g., United
Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971).
106. The committee listed nine factors that it considered indicative of a violation in a state or
political subdivision. These included: (1) the historical discrimination against minority voters;
(2) racially polarized voting; (3) the use of electoral devices that could enhance opportunities for
discrimination against minorities; (4) the denial of minority access to a slating process where one
is available; (5) discrimination in other areas, such as education, employment and health, that
hinders minority participation in the political process; (6) racial appeals in political campaigns; (7)
the extent to which minorities have been elected to public office; (8) a lack of responsiveness by
elected officials to particularized needs of the minority community; and (9) a tenuous policy un-
derlying the use of voting qualifications or other practices. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) provides:
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members
of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
108. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 106, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205
("Plaintiffs ... must show that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circum-
stances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the polit-
ical process.")
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The Supreme Court applied this test for the first time in Thornburg v.
Gingles'019 when it evaluated several districts created in the 1982 North Car-
olina state legislative redistricting plan.110 The Gingles plaintiffs claimed
that multimember districts in several areas of the state served to dilute the
voting strength of black voters, while other districts were formed to fracture
a concentration of black voters sufficient to form a voting majority in one
district."' The Court held that a minority group would be required to
demonstrate three facts in order to establish a claim of voting impairment in
a multimember district:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a ma-
jority in a single member district.... Second, the minority group
must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.... Third, the
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed
. ..- usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 2
Concluding that the districting scheme in North Carolina met these require-
ments and that the "use of a multimember electoral structure has caused
black voters in the districts... to have less opportunity than white voters to
elect representatives of their choice,"' 3 the Court upheld the district court's
judgment that the proposed plan was unconstitutional." 4
On the same day it decided Gingles, the Court resolved a different
reapportionment problem in Davis v. Bandemer."5 In Bandemer, several
Indiana Democrats claimed that the Republican-controlled Indiana legisla-
ture violated the Fourteenth Amendment in its 1981 legislative reapportion-
ment plan by unfairly diluting their votes through a political
gerrymander." 6 Extending a notion intimated in another reapportionment
controversy," 7 the Court determined preliminarily that such controversies
109. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
110. Id. at 34-35.
111. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345,349-50 (1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nor. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
112. Gingles, 478 U.S. at50-51.
113. Id. at 80; cf. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084-85 (1993) (holding that the Gingles
requirements also apply to single-member districts).
114. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. The Court reversed the district court's judgment as to one
district, ruling that black voters had experienced sustained success in that district. Id. at 77, 80.
115. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
116. Id. at 113-15.
117. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-54 (1973). In evaluating a legislative appor-
tionment plan, the Gaffney Court noted that although those who prepared the plan admitted that
virtually every Senate and House district line was drawn with the conscious intent to
create a districting plan that would achieve a rough approximation of the statewide polit-
ical strengths of the Democratic and Republican parties .... [we are quite unconvinced
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are justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment and agreed with the plain-
tiffs that "each political group in a State should have the same chance to
elect representatives of its choice as any other political group."11 How-
ever, the Court reversed the district court's ruling that the districting plan
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' 19 The Court found that, since the
Indiana plan was not "arranged in a manner that [would] consistently de-
grade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole,"'120 the effects of such a plan were not "sufficiently serious" to war-
rant judicial intervention into the state reapportionment process and, there-
fore, the Democrats' equal protection rights were not violated. 2'
Bandemer was the Court's last significant ruling on voting rights that is
directly relevant to Shaw.
The second line of cases implicated in Shaw-the application of strict
scrutiny to racial classifications-is well established in the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court. The Court has long regarded racial classifications with
suspicion, and, indeed, there were several early cases indicating that gov-
ernmental categorizations based merely on considerations of race were im-
permissible.' 2 The modem analysis of racial classifications has expanded
that the reapportionment plan offered by the three-member board violated the Four-
teenth Amendment because it attempted to reflect the relative strength of the parties in
locating and defining election districts. It would be idle, we think, to contend that any
political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is suffi-
cient to invalidate it.... The very essence of districting is to produce a different-a
more "politically fair"-result than would be reached with elections at large, in which
the winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political con-
siderations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.... As we have indi-
cated, multimember districts may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have been
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized.
Id. at 752-54.
118. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124-27 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 134, 143 (plurality opinion).
122. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo the Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practi-
cally to make unjust illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.
Id. at 373-74; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions be-
tween citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classifi-
cation or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protec-
tion."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]U legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.... [and] courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.")
The Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases are two of only a handful to have withstood the "strict
in theory, fatal in fact" scrutiny. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978);
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upon this suspicion by instituting a framework for evaluating such
categorizations.
In 1976, the Court confronted a case dealing with the discriminatory
effects of various government programs. Washington v. Davis1 23 concerned
employment tests that resulted in the hiring of many more whites than
blacks because blacks failed the test in disproportionately high numbers."14
The plaintiffs claimed that the tests, which were designed to measure verbal
capacity and reading comprehension, resulted in the exclusion of blacks at
an exaggerated level and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. 1 5
Holding that discriminatory impact alone is insufficient to support such a
claim, the Court explained that
an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another....
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that ra-
cial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and
are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.1 26
One year later, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 27 the Court encountered a municipal ruling that denied a rezoning
petition for a low- and moderate-income housing development. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the Village of Arlington Heights's denial of the petition
was racially discriminatory and violated, among other things, the Four-
teenth Amendment. 28 Reiterating the position established in Washington
v. Davis, the Court held that proof of a discriminatory purpose is "required"
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 29 The Court added that
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 8 (1972). These decisions have been harshly criti-
cized. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRINE, A1micAN CoNsTrrmoNAL LAW 1466 (2d ed. 1988) (not-
ing that Korematsu is the "one justly infamous episode in which the Court upheld as
'compellingly justified' an overtly racial discrimination"); David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position Debate, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. Rv. 39, 70
(1987) ("[Hirabayashil and [Korematsu] were sobering reminders both of the limits of judicial
review and of the responsibility of other branches for safeguarding fundamental liberties.").
123. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
124. Id. at 235.
125. Id. at 233-35.
126. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
127. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
128. Id. at 254. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals found that the plan had a
racially discriminatory impact. As the denial did not serve any "compelling interests," the court
ruled for the plaintiffs. Id. at 259-60.
129. Id. at 265-66.
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the lack of a discriminatory purpose does not activate a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis and will not support an Equal Protection claim. 3 '
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 3' the Court further
developed the "strict scrutiny" analysis. In Bakke, the mechanisms of a
"special admissions" program designed to increase the representation of
"disadvantaged" students in a medical school class came into question.'32
Under the program, sixteen spaces in the class were reserved for minority
applicants including "Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indi-
ans. 133 Applicants who chose to be considered for this program 34 were
evaluated in a committee completely separated from the rest of the admis-
sions process; candidates from the general and the special programs were
not compared when evaluated for admission purposes.' 35 After being de-
nied admission in two consecutive years, the white plaintiff filed a "reverse
discrimination ' 136 claim alleging that the special admissions program un-
constitutionally excluded him from the medical school on account of his
race.
137
In a divided opinion, 138 the Bakke Court invalidated the special admis-
sions program. 139 The Court was confronted with the question of whether
an express racial classification with benign or remedial effect was permissi-
ble. Although a majority of the Court agreed, after a "stringent examina-
tion,"" 4 that consideration of race was permissible as part of the admissions
process, 14 ' a majority nonetheless found that the program was unlawful.' 42
Realizing that the "concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect
130. Id.
131. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
132. Id. at 272-73.
133. Id. at 274.
134. Candidates were asked on the application form whether they wished to be considered for
the special admissions program. On the 1973 application, the classification was "economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged"; on the 1974 application the classification was "minority
group." Id.
135. Id. at 272-75.
136. See id. at 413 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 276-78.
138. Justice Powell wrote the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Id. at 269.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmum and White wrote ajoint opinion concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, id. at 324, and joined in various parts of Justice Powell's opinion.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 408. Justices White, id. at 379, Marshall, id. at
387, and Blackmun, id. at 402, each filed separate opinions.
139. Id. at 320.
140. Id. at 290.
141. Id. at 320, 325.
142. Id. at 319-20 (finding that the program was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment); id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that the program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
1994]
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temporary arrangements,"143 Justice Powell concluded that racial and ethnic
distinctions "of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination."'"
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,'45 the Court once again splintered on the is-
sue of racial considerations. The Court confronted a congressional spend-
ing program that required ten percent of the federal funds used for public
works projects to be directed to minority businesses.' 46 While attributing
"great weight"' 4 7 to the congressional approach to the matter, the Court
evaluated the constitutionality as well as the objectives of the set-aside plan
and upheld the program. 4 ' Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
concluded that the remedial objectives served by the program were within
the powers reserved to Congress. 149 As Congress was not required to act in
a completely "color-blind" fashion, 150 a majority of the Court concluded
that such a remedial program would pass a test of "strict scrutiny."' 151
The Court used a similar approach when it analyzed a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.5
This agreement permitted a school district to retain minority teachers with
less seniority while nonminority teachers with greater seniority were laid
off. 153 The nonminority plaintiffs alleged that this race-based policy vio-
143. Id. at 295.
144. Id. at 291. Two different "strict scrutiny" tests were set forth in Bakke. Justice Powell's
approach closely resembled that of the traditional "strict scrutiny" analysis: that the purpose of
the classification be "permissible and substantial,' id. at 305, and that its use be "necessary" to
accomplish that objective. Id. The test advocated in the joint opinion of Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, developed in earlier gender discrimination cases, see, e.g., Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), required that the classifications adopted for remedial purposes
"serve important governmental objectives and... be substantially related to ... those objectives."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted).
145. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
146. Id. at 453.
147. Id. at 472 ("[W]e are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to Con-
gress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide for the general
Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
148. Id. at 472-73, 492.
149. Id. at 478.
150. Id. at 482.
151. Id. at 491-92; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). The Fullilove plurality opin-
ion, written by Chief Justice Burger, indicated that the plan would have passed either of the "strict
scrutiny" analyses developed in Bakke. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492. Justice Powell, concurring in
the judgment, agreed that the means in implementing the program were "reasonably necessary"
and found the program constitutional. Id. at 516-17 (Powell, J. concurring in judgment). Justice
Marshall, also concurring, found that the plan survived the "strict scrutiny" analysis put forth in
his joint opinion in Bakke. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
152. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
153. Id. at 270-72 (plurality opinion).
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lated the Equal Protection Clause.'54 Recognizing that "the level of scru-
tiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates
against a group that historically has not been subjected to governmental
discrimination," 55 the plurality held that the remedial layoff policy was not
"justified by a compelling governmental interest."' 56 While the district
court had held that remedying general societal discrimination was a suffi-
cient interest to justify the agreement, the Court ruled that this approach
was too indefinite an approach, stating that "[i]n the absence of particular-
ized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach
into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future."'157
A majority of the Court finally adopted the application of "strict scru-
tiny" to benign race-based classifications in City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co. 5 The Croson Court examined a Richmond, Virginia munici-
pal plan requiring contractors to subcontract thirty percent of their contract
to "minority business enterprises" in order to remedy past discrimination.15 9
Stating that "there is no way of determining what classifications are 'be-
nign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegiti-
mate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics"'160 without a
"searching judicial inquiry," '' Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
found that the plan failed to meet either requirement. 62 Because none of
the evidence specifically identified any discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry, and because using past general societal discrimina-
tion would be an unrealistic and unwieldy standard, the Court held that no
"compelling interest" existed to justify the allotment of public contracts
based on race.'6 3 Furthennore, the plan was not "narrowly tailored" be-
cause the city failed to show a need for the remedy; the plan had not been
linked to identifiable discrimination and the city had not considered any of
the "array" of race-neutral means of increasing the availability of opportuni-
ties to minorities as well as other small businesses."6
154. Id. (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 273 (plurality opinion).
156. Id. at 274-76 (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 276.
158. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional an intentional preference for one race over another in administering layoffs);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that the reservation of a fixed
number of university admissions for minorities is unconstitional).
159. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-81.
160. Id. at 493.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 505, 507-08.
163. Id. at 505.
164. Id. at 507-11.
19941
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The Shaw decision is a product of a Croson-style analysis extended
into the area of voting rights: a stringent examination of a state's reappor-
tionment plan where districts are allegedly drawn on racial lines. The goal
embodied in Shaw is a laudable one: "[A] political system in which race
no longer matters." 165 The Court's extension of "color-blindness" into the
area of voting rights jurisprudence is intended to prevent the "balkaniza-
tion" of American politics into competing racial factions. 166 Thus, the
Shaw Court affirmed the principle previously stated in Croson and inti-
mated in other opinions: 67 While Americans must still fight to expose ra-
cism and the injustices that it inflicts on society, it is time to "reach out
across lines of color and creed to touch and mobilize people from all
groups.168
Be that as it may, the Shaw framework contains several shortcomings.
First, it fails to distinguish the facts of Shaw from those in cases that con-
flict with its rationale. 69 Second, the Shaw court applies strict scrutiny in
a manner inconsistent with voting rights precedent and infeasible in the
context of redistricting. 7 ' Finally, the Shaw decision creates more ques-
tions about apportionment than answers. 1 7 1
Although the Shaw majority gives the United Jewish Organizations"'2
opinion only cursory mention, the controversy over the North Carolina plan
most closely resembles the situation in that case. As noted earlier, the chal-
lenged reapportionment plan in United Jewish Organizations split a Hasidic
Jewish group into two different districts, a move that the plaintiffs alleged
unconstitutionally "diluted" their votes simply for the purpose of achieving
a racial "quota" in the districts.' 3 The Shaw majority considered the ruling
"highly fractured"' 74 due to the three different justifications enumerated for
upholding the New York plan." 5 Yet a majority in United Jewish Organi-
165. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 319-20 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978).
168. Jim Sleeper, Ethnic 'Sensitivity' Is Drawing Lines It Means to Erase, C. TMB., Oct. 12,
1993, at 19.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 172-96.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 197-228.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 229-235.
172. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
173. Id. at 153 (plurality opinion).
174. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829.
175. See United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165 (plurality opinion) ("mhe plan did not mini-
mize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength."); id. at 176 (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
("mhe resort to a numerical racial criterion as a method of achieving compliance with the aims
of the Voting Rights Act is ...consistent with [the] consensus [supporting more elaborate
measures to secure the right to vote]"); id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) ('Ihe
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zations agreed that discriminatory purpose and effect are the important con-
siderations in evaluating a reapportionment plan.' 7 6
The Shaw Court held that "[n]othing in [United Jewish Organiza-
tions] precludes white voters ... from bringing the analytically distinct
claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as any-
thing other than an effort to segregate voting districts on the basis of race
without sufficient justification."' 177 Nonetheless, this contention was the
centerpiece of the United Jewish Organizations plaintiffs' argument: "Our
argument is... that.., there could be-and in fact was-no reason other
than race to divide the community ....178  The Court resolved this ques-
tion against the plaintiffs, employing the basic test regarding discriminatory
purpose and effect.' 79 Justice White therefore concluded that the claim cre-
ated by the Shaw majority was "in plain view and did not carry the day for
petitioners."IS
Apparently, the shape of North Carolina's districts distinguishes the
state's plan from the one in United Jewish Organizations. The Shaw Court
relied on "traditional districting principles'' 1s as the main characteristic
separating what may be acceptable racial considerations in the reapportion-
ment process from those that are unacceptable. In previous cases, the Court
had focused its inquiry on whether the electoral system at issue had "sub-
stantially disadvantag[ed] certain voters in their opportunity to influence
clear purpose with which the New York Legislature acted-in response to the position of the
United States Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act-forecloses any finding that it
acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters.").
176. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting). Five members of the Court "were of the
view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the
effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was
not implicated." Id.; see also United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165 (plurality opinion) ("[There
was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the
county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength."); id. at 179,
180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) ("Having failed to show that the legislative reapportion-
ment plan had either the purpose or the effect of discriminating against them on the basis of their
race, the petitioners have offered no basis for affording them the constitutional relief they seek.").
The North Carolina plan was not found to have violated the Voting Rights Act as interpreted
prior to Shaw; while the majority did not address the issue, both the district court, see Pope v.
Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392,396-97 (W.D.N.C. 1992); Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461,472 (E.D.N.C.
1992), as well as the Shaw dissenters, see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting); id. at
2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dis-
senting), found that the plan did not have the requisite discriminatory purpose and effect as pro-
vided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
177. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
178. Id. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 6 n.6, United Jewish
Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1976) (No. 75-104) (citation omitted).
179. See supra note 175.
180. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2824, 2829; see also id. at 2829, 2832 ("sound districting principles").
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the political process effectively." '182 Justice O'Connor expressed her views
on this type of evidence in her Bandemer concurrence:
[Wihere a racial minority group is characterized by "the tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness" and is vulnerable to exclusion from
the political process, ... individual voters who belong to that
group enjoy some measure of protection against intentional dilu-
tion of their group voting strength by means of racial gerryman-
dering. As a matter of past history and present reality, there is a
direct and immediate relationship between the racial minority's
group voting strength in a particular community and the individ-
ual rights of its members to vote and to participate in the political
process.... Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the
racial minority group can prove that it has "essentially been shut
out of the political process."1 3
A particular aesthetic quality has never been held to constitute a fed-
eral constitutional requirement for districts," s and, although the Shaw ma-
jority recognizes this, the opinion primarily emphasizes the odd shape of
the district.18 5 While the infeasibility of mandating a standard based on the
182. Id. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133
(1986)); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) ("[I]nvidious discrimination...
results when the ghetto, along with all other Democrats, suffers the disaster of losing too many
elections."); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ("[There was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the
political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting
strength."); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) ("The plaintiffs' burden is to produce
evidence.., that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation by the group in question .... ).
183. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 151-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added)
(quoting majority opinion, id. at 139), quoted in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 n.4 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice O'Connor also commented on this matter in Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986):
I would adhere to the approach outlined in Whitcomb and White and followed [in other
cases]. Under that approach, a court should consider all relevant factors bearing on
whether the minority group has "less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (emphasis added). The court should not focus solely on the mi-
nority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice. Whatever measure of undi-
luted minority voting strength the court employs in connection with evaluating the
presence or absence of minority electoral success, it should also bear in mind that "the
power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections."
Id at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (second emphasis added) (quoting Bandemer,
478 U.S. at 132).
184. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 752 n.18 (1973)).
185. Compare Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 ("We emphasize that [the criteria of compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions] are important not because they are constitution-
ally required-they are not... but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a
claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.") with id. at 2824 ("It is unsettling
how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the
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"attractiveness" of a districting plan is apparent, the Court's emphasis on
form is also inconsistent with its prior treatment of similar districting situa-
tions.186 In Bandemer,87 the Court drew its rationale from earlier racial
gerrymandering cases, 188 holding that the "deliberate and arbitrary distor-
tion"'8 9 of district lines does not result in a constitutional violation unless
the lines are "arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's
or group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."' 19 0 Justice
White borrowed from this rationale to argue in his dissenting opinion that
the Court's approach in Shaw'9' "immediately casts attention in the wrong
direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the
political realities of district composition." 192
These political realities also reveal problems with the majority's ap-
proach. The implementation of minority-majority districts is often precipi-
tated by bloc voting along racial lines coupled with historical discrimination
against minorities. In areas where there is bloc voting of this type and mi-
nority voting is traditionally aligned with one political party, courts will be
unable-when a district like North Carolina's Twelfth is drawn-to deline-
ate the unconstitutional "racial-consideration" gerrymanders on the one
hand from the constitutional political gerrymanders, as provided for in
Bandemer, on the other. In these situations, which arguably would include
past."), id. at 2820-21 (describing district as "unusually shaped") and id. at 2827 ("[W]e believe
that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.").
186. See id. at 2848-49 (Souter, J., dissenting) As Justice Souter stated:
[Where the Shaw claim is pleaded], the State will have to justify its decision to consider
race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly
tailored to that interest. Meanwhile, in other districting cases, specific consequential
harm will still need to be pleaded and proven.... The Court offers no adequate justifi-
cation for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently
from other districting claims. The only justification I can imagine would be the preser-
vation of "sound districting principles," [but] we have held that such principles are not
constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the dis-
tinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today.
IL (footnotes and citations omitted).
187. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
188. Id. at 131 n.12 ("Although these cases involved racial groups, we believe that the princi-
ples developed in these cases would apply equally to claims by political groups in individual
districts."), cited in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
189. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 138.
190. Id. at 132, 142-43; see also id. at 138-39 ("We disagree... with.., the conception that
'the intentional drawing of district boundaries for partisan ends and for no other reason violates
the Equal Protection Clause in and of itself."').
191. See infra text accompanying notes 240-58 for a further discussion of the role of the
"traditional notions" of reapportionment.
192. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting RoBERT G. DiXON, DaaMo-
CRATIC REPREsENTATION REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND PoLmcs 459 (1968)).
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the North Carolina plan,193 it will be impossible to distinguish where the
racial considerations end and where the political considerations begin.
Therefore, proving that there has been a constitutionally impermissible use
of race in drawing the plan will be impossible. Indeed, Justice Stevens's
dissent in Shaw notes that invoking the Gingles factors' 94-- that a minority
group is "politically cohesive" and that white voters ordinarily vote as a
bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidate-necessitates proving
what the majority labels as "impermissible racial stereotypes.""9 5 Justice
Stevens observed that, as a result, "citizens and legislators... will no doubt
be confused by the Court's requirement of evidence [regarding vote dilu-
tion] in one type of case that the Constitution now prevents reliance on in
another."196
In evaluating the plaintiffs' claim that the North Carolina plan was "so
bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race," 197
the Court drew upon its recent decisions in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education'98 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.199 to apply strict
193. Justice White hinted at this in his dissent, in which he stated that districting to protect
incumbents
appears to be what has occurred in this instance.... North Carolina's decision to create
a majority-minority district can be explained to meet [the objection of the Attorney
General]. Its decision not to create the more compact southern minority-majority dis-
trict that was suggested, on the other hand, was more likely a result of partisan consider-
ations.... With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding
why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about
the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting
Rights Act."
Shaw, 113 S. CL at 2841-42 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Grofman, supra note 12, at
1258). Indeed, much of the negative commentary about the plan in the legislative debate revolved
around assertions that it was a partisan gerrymander. See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. Cochrane, Senate
Chamber Proceedings, 1991 Extra Session of the N.C. General Assembly, Jan. 24, 1992, at 23
("[The plan] is gerrymandering of the most partisan order."); Remarks of Rep. Balmer, House
Floor Debate, 1991 Extra Session of the N.C. General Assembly, Jan. 23, 1992, at 10 ("[T]his
map right here is going to become the test case in the Federal Courts for the issue of partisan
gerrymandering."); Remarks of Rep. Pope, id. at 39 ("[The plan] is pure partisan gerrymander-
ing."). The first suit involving the North Carolina plan was brought by, among others, the North
Carolina Republican Party, which claimed that the reapportionment plan violated its members'
equal protection rights under Bandemer as a political gerrymander. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp.
392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), afrd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). The claim was dismissed by the district court,
which stated that the plaintiffs "do not allege, nor can they, that the state's redistricting plan has
caused them to be 'shut out of the political process.'" hid at 397. The Supreme Court summarily
affirmed this decision. 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
194. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
195. Shaw, 113 S. CL 2844 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2827); see also id. at
2845 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially po-
larized bloc voting cannot be equated with the 'invocation of race stereotypes' described by the
Court ... and forbidden by our case law." (quotations omitted)).
196. Id. at 2844 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2825.
198. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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scrutiny to what is arguably a benign racial classification in a voting rights
context. This approach, as noted earlier, is based upon the theory that
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm [and]
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility."200 Therefore, racial classifications are required to be "jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest, and.., the means chosen by
the State to effectuate its purpose [must] be narrowly tailored,"20 1 a notion
earlier indicated in Bakke.2"2 The Court concluded that its prior voting
rights jurisprudence, in particular Gomillion v. Lightfool203 and Wright v.
Rockefeller,2" supported such a "strict scrutiny" analysis of the plaintiffs'
claim.205
Reliance on these cases, however, seems misplaced. In Gomillion, the
plaintiffs' claim was resolved under the Fifteenth Amendment; because
Tuskegee's redefinition of the city boundaries operated to "depriv[e] the
petitioners of the municipal franchise and [its] consequent rights [thus]
despoil[ing] colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore
enjoyed voting rights, 20 6 the Court's paramount concern was the effect of
the city's action.207 Although the concurring opinion of Justice Whittaker
remarked that the decision would more properly be based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, he appeared to agree that the important issue was that black
voters were being "fenced out" of the process.20" The Gomillion opinion
simply does not support the "contention that district lines drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their
adoption."2°9 Indeed, the Gomillion opinion does not even address the is-
sue of the proper Fourteenth Amendment standard of review.210
199. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
200. Id. at 493.
201. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, L, concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
202. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,305 (1978) ("We have held that in order
to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary... to
the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." (quotations and citations
omitted)).
203. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
204. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
205. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-28.
206. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347.
207. But see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 181 (1977)
(Burger, C.J, dissenting) ("If Gomillion teaches anything, I had thought it was that drawing of
political boundary lines with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a predetermined racial result
cannot ordinarily be squared with the Constitution.")
208. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
209. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60 for a discussion of Gomillion.
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The Court cites Wright to illustrate "the difficulty of determining from
the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distin-
guishes between voters on the basis of race."2"' Although this is undoubt-
edly a valid proposition, it does not seem to support the majority's
conclusion that strict scrutiny is necessary in this instance. The Court in
Wright affirmed the district court's judgment that the plaintiffs "failed upon
the facts and the law" to prove that the congressional reapportionment plan
devised by the New York legislature in 1961 was implemented with dis-
criminatory intent.212 As Justice White stated in his dissent in Shaw,
I fail to see how a decision based on a failure to establish discrim-
inatory intent can support the inference that it is unnecessary to
prove discriminatory effect.
Wright is relevant only to the extent that it illustrates a prop-
osition with which I have no problem: That a complaint stating
that a plan has carved out districts on the basis of race can, under
certain circumstances, state a claim under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of dis-
criminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a
race-conscious redistricting plan depends on these twin ele-
ments .... In the present case, the facts could sustain no such
allegation.213
While the Shaw majority invoked previous voting rights cases in
reaching its decision that a district drawn along racial lines is impermissi-
ble, a close examination of the Court's prior voting rights jurisprudence
suggests a different conclusion: The primary concern in analyzing a redis-
tricting plan is the purpose and effect of the plan. As noted earlier, Justice
O'Connor reviewed the Court's racial gerrymandering cases in her concur-
ring opinion in Bandemer and expressed her view that "the individual's
right is infringed only if the racial minority group can prove that it has
'essentially been shut out of the political process.'" 214 Other recent cases
have all recognized the same point-that the integral considerations in vot-
ing rights cases are discriminatory purpose and effect.215
211. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
212. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1964). For a discussion of Wright, see supra
text accompanying notes 61-63.
213. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839-40 (White, J., dissenting).
214. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 151-52 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting plurality opinion, id. at 139).
215. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 35-38, 44-46 (1986); id. at 84, 91, 98-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62, 66, 69 (1980); id. at 90-92 (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment); id. at 95, 97 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 104, 108 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (forbidding voting laws with discriminatory purpose and effect).
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The Court also ignored the fundamental inconsistency of the standard
set forth in Shaw; although a "strict scrutiny" analysis is effective in eradi-
cating invidiously discriminatory programs in other contexts,2 16
electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require
some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a
racially mixed population. ... One need look no further than the
Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and
we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account
in order to comply with that Act.2 17
Whereas situations traditionally subjected to strict scrutiny analysis "char-
acteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advan-
tage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a
different race, ' 218 electoral districting does not possess such a "zero-sum"
nature. As Justice Souter explained in his dissent, "the mere placement of
an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or
benefit provided to others. '219 Although the Court has recognized the con-
cept of the "dilution '" 2 of minority votes inside a majority district, this
recognition has been within a framework in which discriminatory purpose
and effect compose integral parts of the equation.
Justice Souter's dissent proposed one approach to this quandary:
[I]n the absence of an allegation of [discriminatory purpose and
effect constituting] cognizable harm, there is no need for further
scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven with-
out the element of harm. Nor if dilution is proven is there any
need for further constitutional scrutiny; there has never been a
suggestion that such use of race could be justified under any type
of scrutiny, since the dilution of the right to vote can not be said
to serve any legitimate governmental purpose.22
216. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (city contracting);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs).
217. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). While race may
always play some role in districting decisions, the only circumstance in which it is undisputable
that a reapportionment plan would be absolutely "unexplainable on grounds other than race," id. at
2825 (citation omitted), is one in which race is the only demographic factor considered: if, for
example, a "district' were to be created by compiling a list limited to minority voters. Interview
with Professor John C. Boger, University of North Carolina School of Law (Jan. 27, 1994).
218. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; Fulli-
love v. Ilutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1979)); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion) (addressing racial quotas in teacher layoffs).
219. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
220. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-51 (1986) (multimember districts); Growe v.
Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084-85 (1993) (single-member districts).
221. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (Souter, J., dissenting). Presumably, such dilution would
violate the Fifteenth Amendment regardless of the level of scrutiny under Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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As the Shaw majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of
state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it
draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." '222 The
customary "strict scrutiny" analysis is therefore an infeasible and inappro-
priate means with which to evaluate such a reapportionment plan.223
Even if the strict scrutiny test is appropriate in the reapportionment
context, the North Carolina plan may satisfy its requirements. Compliance
with the Voting Rights Act should meet the requirement that the plan be
"justified by a compelling governmental interest." 224 The question of
whether the plan was "narrowly tailored," 2z  however, presents a more
complicated question. Justice White asserted that North Carolina's actions
in creating the second plan were "narrowly tailored," in that it was "pre-
cisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior
plan." 6 The concept of a "narrowly tailored" plan as enumerated in
222. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original).
223. The majority opinion intimated, see id. at 2832, and the petitioners' brief alleged, Brief
for Appellant at 11, Shaw (No. 92-357), that the North Carolina plan violated the ideal of the
"color-blind Constitution." See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J. dissenting)). Although espousing the "dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society
where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement," Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06,
this concept has been criticized in that it "legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic,
and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1991). But see ANDRaw Kuu., Tan
CoLoR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (arguing that the "color-blind" approach is better suited to-
ward historical goals of racial equality); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 1312, 1318-20 (1986) (arguing that affirmative action "is
both destructive of the racial equality and potentially harmful to society," and that the conse-
quences include "the decline of occupational and professional standards" resulting in a "spoils
system among competing racial and ethnic groups").
224. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830 ("The States certainly have a very strong interest in comply-
ing with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as ap-
plied."); id. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting) ("I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the
Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest."). This, of course, assumes that § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act remains constitutional. The Shaw plaintiffs' contention was that, if the
Voting Rights Act required North Carolina to adopt the plan in question, then § 2 was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 2831. The Shaw majority refused to resolve this question, leaving it open for consid-
eration on remand. Id. Complying with the "norretrogression" principle in Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), avoiding dilution of black voting strength, see Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and eliminating the past effects of racial discrimination, see Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 498-506, were also discussed as possible alternatives in making out a "compelling
interest." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830-32; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
286 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("[A]lthough its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in
the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context
of higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest." (cita-
tions omitted)).
225. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
226. Id. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
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Croson,227  however, looks to "alternative remedies," including
"race-neutral means," to rectify an equal protection violation.
22
The concept of "alternative remedies" in a voting rights claim is com-
plicated: what exactly constitutes an "alternative remedy"? One obvious
answer, and the one hinted at by the Shaw majority,229 would be the draw-
ing of a "better" district. This solution, however, would prove to be unman-
ageable. The available alternatives for a districting plan are virtually
endless, and with current computer technology enabling one to "revise a
boundary line and receive instant readouts of the voting behavior, racial
composition and other ... characteristics [of the] district,"'230 a contest to
see who could come up with the "best" district would be not only unwieldy,
but unwinnable as well. Such is the reasoning behind the Court's reluc-
tance to "embroil the judiciary in second-guessing what has consistently
been referred to as a political task for the legislature."'"
Countless other questions are created by imposing a standard that the
remedy be "narrowly tailored" in these types of circumstances:
Is it more "narrowly tailored" to create an irregular major-
ity-minority district as opposed to one that is compact but harms
other State interests such as incumbency protection or the repre-
sentation of rural interests? Of the following two options-crea-
tion of two minority influence districts or of a single
majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the
other not? Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed
redistricting change violates § 5's nonretrogression principle in
that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "nar-
rowly tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve
the status quo? Or can it maintain that change, while attempting
to enhance minority voting power in some other manner?23 2
The infeasibility of the strict scrutiny standard becomes all the more appar-
ent when one considers "narrowly tailoring" in the context of a claim that
arguably lacks a constitutional injury. This unmanageability reinforces the
dissenters' contention that state efforts designed to remedy minority vote
dilution are qualitatively different from the "affirmative action" programs
that the Court has previously resolved with strict scrutiny. 33 The dissenters
227. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
228. Il at 507 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
229. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 ("[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter.").
230. Arthur A. Anderson & William S. Dahlstrom, Technological Gerrymandering: How
Computers Can Be Used in the Redistricting Process to Comply with Judicial Criteria, 22 URB.
LAW. 59, 74 (1990).
231. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
232. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 2842-43 (White, J., dissenting).
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thus conclude that the matters of redistricting at issue in Shaw, rather than
involving preferential treatment to one group at the expense of another,
234
operated to balance the playing field through creating districts that did not
"unfairly minimize the voting power of any group." 5
Several different solutions have been attempted and others proposed to
counteract the problems associated with the "shutting out" of certain groups
from the political process. Cumulative voting," 6 limited voting,237 and the
single transferable vote238 are practices that have been experimented with
and debated in various forums. As "form" was the driving component of
the majority's rationale, a solution also lies in evolving from the "traditional
notions" of form in the process of redistricting. As noted earlier, the con-
cept of "form" as an integral requirement of complying with the Voting
Rights Act not only ignores the reality, recognized even by the Shaw major-
ity, that "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in
that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines,"239
but also disregards the inadequacies of a strict "compactness" requirement.
234. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-73 (1986) (addressing
layoffs); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-83 (1989) (discussing a
set-aside plan).
235. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
236. Under a cumulative voting scheme, each voter is entitled to cast as many votes as there
are seats to be filled, just as in traditional at-large elections, but voters may aggregate their votes
by giving a preferred candidate or candidates more than one vote. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HAv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rlv. 173, 231 (1989). For example, if there are seven seats to be filled in an elec-
tion, each voter would have seven votes; voters could vote for seven different candidates, dis-
tribute their votes among fewer than seven, or "plump" all their votes for one favorite candidate.
Id. at 232 (citation omitted). Cumulative voting systems are commonly used in elections for
corporate boards of directors. Id. For a more detailed discussion of cumulative voting, see id. at
231-36. See also Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote
Dilution: The Case of Alamagordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469 (1989) (discussing cumula-
tive voting); Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large
Systems, 92 YALE LJ. 144 (1982) (same).
237. Under a limited voting scheme, each voter has fewer votes than there are seats to be filled
in a multimember district-"the voter is limited to voting for less than a full slate." Karlan, supra
note 236, at 223-24. For example, in a district with three seats to be filled, voters are limited to
voting for only two candidates. Id. at 224. Limited voting systems have been used by local
governments in many areas, particularly in the Northeast. Id. For a more detailed discussion of
limited voting, see id. at 223-31.
238. The single transferable vote allows voters to rank candidates on their ballots, with each
voter listing their choices in order of preference. Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferable
Vote: Achieving the Goals of Section 2 Without Sacrificing the Integration Ideal, 9 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 405, 420 (1991). The drawing of districts is unnecessary, as all voters may choose
among all candidates in an election. Id. The system "maximizes the effectiveness of individual
votes by transferring votes from (1) candidates who have more than enough votes to be elected
and (2) candidates who have little or no chance of being elected." Id. (citation omitted). For a
more detailed discussion of the single transferable vote, see id. at 420-29.
239. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
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In speaking to the issue of population equality among districts thirty years
ago, Chief Justice Warren discussed the role of geography in districting
plans:
[P]eople, not trees or pastures, vote. Modem developments and
improvements in transportation and communications make rather
hollow, in the mid-1960s, most claims that deviations from popu-
lation-based representation can be validly based solely on geo-
graphical considerations. Arguments for allowing such
deviations in order to... prevent legislative districts from becom-
ing so large that the availability of access of citizens to their rep-
resentatives is impaired are today, for the most part,
unconvincing. 4
These words ring equally true, if not more so, today. It is unrealistic to say
that, in a nation as technologically advanced and interconnected as ours, a
district such as North Carolina's Twelfth, or any other that might cover a
large or irregularly-shaped geographical area, prevents voters from gaining
access to the candidates running for or representatives serving in an elective
post.
24 1
Some argue that the "traditional" idea of geographic compactness, as
expressed in Shaw, also reflects the trend by which geographic compactness
"has been transformed from a shorthand expression for broadly inclusionary
values into a way of short-circuiting claims of racial vote dilution."'242
Although there have been many mathematical definitions of compactness
devised,24 3 they are usually defined in strict geographic terms. 2' Indeed,
240. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
241. For example, the entire state of Montana, which has a land area of 147,076 square miles,
29 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BarrrAcA 418 (1992), constitutes one congressional district. U.S.
GOV'T PRINT G OFFICE, 1993-1994 OMncLA. CONGREssIoNAL. DnRcroRY, 103d CONGRESs 1163
(1993).
242. Karlan, supra note 236, at 210.
243. These definitions include:
1. Compare the area of a district to the area of the smallest circle that could contain the
districts [sic].
2. Compare the perimeter of the district to the perimeter of a circle of equal area.
3. Compute the ratio of the length [sic] of the major and minor axes of the district.
4. Compare the aggregate length of the boundaries of all the districts with the aggre-
gate length of all districts under any other plan consistent with the population and polit-
ical subdivision standards.
Anderson & Dahlstrom, supra note 230, at 74-75.
However, one geographer has criticized these types of definitions and proposed a more socio-
political view of compactness:
A too simplistic application of such geographic compactness measures is foolish,
especially where the distribution of population is irregular within districts. In many
regions, the population is uneven, perhaps strung out along roads or railroads. Travel
may be easier and cheaper in some directions than in others, such that an elongated
district astride a major transport corridor might in fact be the most compact in the sense
of minimum travel time for a representative to travel around the district. If so, then a
1994]
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some district court opinions indicate the restrictive manner in which the
concept of "compactness" in a Gingles-type analysis has been construed. In
Potter v. Washington County,' 5 for example, a Florida district court invali-
dated-partially on the basis of a lack of compactness-a municipal dis-
tricting plan creating a minority-majority district by combining pieces of
three different areas of the county. In stating that the plan "suffer[ed] from
unacceptable 'gerrymandering' by creating a minority district that arbitrar-
ily cuts diagonally through the center of the county,"" 6 the court used geo-
graphical considerations to deny a minority group a more influential role in
the political process where a more geographically concentrated, but equally
populous minority group would have been able to ensure such a role.247
Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Education,"4 an Alabama federal
district court decision, advocates a different approach. In Dillard, the de-
fendant board objected to the creation of a minority-majority district due to
the "elongated and curvaceous" nature of the district, and its therefore not
modified criterion, the ratio of maximum to minimum travel time, would be a preferred
measure.
RiCHARD L. MoRRIuL, PoLmAL REDrSTR rCTN AND GEooRAPmc THEORY 22 (1981). Such an
approach could be applied to North Carolina's Twelfth District, which runs down Interstate 85
from Durham to Gastonia. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992) rev'd sub nom.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
While such an approach was not mentioned in any of the Shaw opinions, it has not gone
unnoticed by the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens noted this theory in a discussion of "compact-
ness" in his concurrence in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 768 n.20 (1983), a case involving
the "one person, one vote" rule as applied to New Jersey's 1980 reapportionment of its congres-
sional districts.
244. Twenty-eight states have compactness provisions regarding legislative or congressional
apportionment plans. See ALASKA CONST. art. 6, § 6; ARK. CONsT. art. 8, § 3 (providing for
"convenient" districts); COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 47(1); ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 3(a); IOWA CONST,
§ 42.4 (West 1993) (providing for "convenient" districts); ME. CONST. art. 4, Pt. 1, § 2; MicH,
CONsT. art. 4, § 2(2); MD. CONST. art. 3, § 4; Mm. CONST. art. 4, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. 3, §§ 2,5,
45; MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 14(1); NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 5; N.Y. CoNsT. art. 3, § 4; N.D. CONST.
art. 4, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 16; R.I. CONST. art. 7, § 1, art. 8, § 1; S.D. CONsT. art. 3, § 5; VA.
CONST. art. 2, § 6; VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 43(5) (providing for "compact
and convenient" districts); W. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 4; WIs. CONST. art. 4, §§ 4, 5 (providing for
"convenient" districts"); Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 49; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.031 (West 1993); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 25-2(b)(2) (Michie 1992); ME. R-v. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1201 (West 1993);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5-3-101(a) (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-10 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2-7C-3, 2-8C-2 (1993); N.Y. ELzc. LAW § 4-100 (McKinney 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4.001
(West 1993).
245. 653 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Fla. 1986).
246. Id. at 130.
247. Karlan, supra note 236, at 208-09; see also Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d
1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1988) ("It is sadly ironic that the district court concluded that because many
Hispanic voters would still not be able to elect representatives of their choice under the proposed
plan, no Section 2 claim could be maintained, thereby relegating all Hispanic voters to having no
political effectiveness."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989).
248. 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
meeting the Gingles requirement of "compactness."'249 The Dillard court
read Gingles in a different fashion:
By compactness, [Gingles] does not mean that a proposed district
must meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as
symmetry or attractiveness.... It is apparent from the [Gingles]
opinion that compactness is a relative term tied to certain practi-
cal objectives under § 2; the requirement is not that a district be
compact, but that it be "sufficiently compact" under § 2. The
term is a "practical" or "functional" concept, which must be con-
sidered in relation to § 2's laudatory national mission of opening
up the political process to those minorities that have been histori-
cally denied such [participation].... [Compactness] is therefore
a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it
aids or facilitates the political process .... 250
The conclusion drawn in Dillard reflects a more functional approach to
section 2 and the Gingles requirements: that "a district is sufficiently geo-
graphically compact if it allows for effective representation."'
Justice Souter suggests a similar method of interpreting section 2 in his
dissenting opinion in Shaw.2"2 His dissent speaks to the "commonality of
interest" prevalent in some racial groups that makes the terminology "mi-
nority voting strength" and "dilution of minority votes" meaningful.2"3
This "commonality" reflects similar concerns and experiences and provides
a means by which people attain a community with a coherent identity.
Commonality of interest, as employed in reapportionment cases prior to
Shaw, has been used to determine whether dilution of minority voting has
occurred. 4
Districts with coherent identities, therefore, need not be drawn along
geographical lines; although geographical considerations do provide a
means by which a district can have a coherent identity, it is not the only
249. Id. at 1465.
250. Id. at 1465-66.
251. Id. at 1466; see also Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1356 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated
sub nom. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993)
("[The functional view of compactness described in Dillard] in light of effective representation is
a sound approach to the problems of compactness.... Further, this approach allows the court to
consider communities of interest which may be involved"); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 549-50
(Cal. 1992) In Wilson the court stated that
the functional aspect of geographical compactness takes into account the presence or
absence of a sense of community made possible by open lines of access and communi-
cation. We approve of the Masters' approach in determining the compactness of a par-
ticular minority group for purposes of assuring its protection under the Voting Rights
Act.
IL (citation omitted).
252. Shaw, 113 S. CL at 2845 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
254. ld. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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means. In using the demographic data already employed in drawing the
districts themselves, a state could justify its reapportionment plan by show-
ing that, despite the lack of a "true" geographical affiliation, a district in
question has a coherent identity and therefore warrants, and indeed can
practically support, an effective governmental representative.
An approach concentrating on the "personality" of a district would
also effectively address the problematic issue of race as the paramount con-
cern in reapportionment. Such an approach would allow a "suspect" district
to be validated where a Shaw claim is pleaded and a strict scrutiny analysis
is applied-after a state demonstrated a "compelling governmental inter-
est," a plan would be narrowly tailored after a showing that a district ques-
tioned within the Shaw framework possessed sufficient "commonality" to
support an effective representative.255  Such an arrangement would more
properly reflect the functional approach to section 2,'16 and would embody
what has been described as the "inclusionary" spirit of the Voting Rights
Act.25 7
Regarding the North Carolina plan, such an approach would show that
the districts do indeed possess coherent identities: as the most urban district
in North Carolina,2 8 voters in the Twelfth District have common concerns
255. This approach is consistent with Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), in examining
the "commonality" of a district. While evidence of "commonality" was used in Gingles as part of
an overall scheme to establish vote dilution, see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, in this type of approach
the same type of evidence would be utilized to legitimize a district drawn where a "compelling
governmental interest," for example, a violation of the Voting Rights Act, has been proven. See
also supra note 224 (discussing other possible compelling governmental interests). Where no
violation has been established, presumably the focus would be more on whether a "compelling
governmental interest" has been met. One could argue, however, that an approach that allows for
the inclusion of race as one of many considerations in a reapportionment plan would not even be
subject to a Shaw analysis in that it employs, and therefore can be explained by, factors other than
race.
256. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) ("[T]he Committee determined that
'the question of whether the political processes are "equally open" depends upon a searching
practical evaluation of the "past and present reality"... and on a 'functional' view of the political
process."' (quoting S. Rm,. No. 417, supra note 101, at 30 & n.120, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208)).
257. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. Ray. 1, 1-2 (1991) ("[The Voting Rights Act and its amendments]
represent a national political consensus about the need to take extraordinary measures to bring
about the effective inclusion of black Americans in the political system."); Edward J. Sebold,
Note, Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single-Member Offices, 88 MicH. L. REv.
2199, 2201 (1990) ("Mhe goal of Section 2 is to bolster civic inclusion in the political process
by eliminating the lingering effects of race discrimination."); Evelyn Elayne Shockley, Note, Vot-
ing Rights Act Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and the Minority Community's Representa-
tive of Choice, 89 Mica. L. REv. 1038, 1059 (1991) ("'[Clivic inclusion' is what Congress meant
by its 'participat[ion] in the political process' language [found in 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b)].").
258. U.S. DEPT. op COMMERCF, 1990 UNTED STATES CENsus OF POPULATION AND Housiao,
POPULATION AND HousiNo CHARAcr~musTcs FOR CoNGREssiONAL DisTiUcrs OF Til 103D CON-
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about issues such as transportation, crime, education, and health care that
may differ in many respects from those of North Carolinians living in rural
areas." 9 The district also has the most dense population,260 the second
lowest per capita income,261 the highest percentage of single-mother house-
holds,2 62 and the highest rate of public transportation use in the state.263
Although recognizing that there is indeed a great degree of commonality
within some racial groups, an approach that employs common characteris-
tics like these also allows for coherent representation across racial lines.
This type of representation is practical and meaningful, not only to those
who are included in these groupings, but also to those who are affected by
the problems inherent in a district with the qualities represented by these
groupings.
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way."2 4 In advocating a move toward a "color-blind"
GPESs 40 (1993) [hereinafter POPULATION AND HousiNG CHARAcrmsTIcs]. The Twelfth Dis-
trict is 86.3% urban. Id.
259. These common areas of interest were apparently a significant issue of concern in the
process of creating the plans. See Remarks of Rep. Fitch, House Floor Debate, 1991 Extra Ses-
sion of the N.C. General Assembly, Jan. 23, 1992, at 3. As Representative Fitch stated in the
House floor debate:
Although these majority black districts are spread out they have a commonalty [sic] of
characteristics. District I in the Eastern part of North Carolina is largely rural in charac-
ter. Only 18 percent of its population lives in cities of 20,000 or more. In contrast
District 12 which runs from Gastonia through Charlotte to Winston Salem to Greens-
boro and to Durham is urban in character. Eighty percent of its population lives in cities
of 20,000 or more.... [The proposed southeastern district] does not have commonalty
[sic] of characteristics providing people of Charlotte and Wilmington in their urban
needs with people of Anson and Bladen counties which are rural and have rural needs.
Id.; see also, e.g. Remarks of Sen. Winner, Meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Congressional
Redistricting, 1991 Extra Session of the N.C. General Assembly, Jan. 22, 1992, at 21:
There is clearly more of a community of interest (with the plan as opposed to other
proposals). I mean you are combining urban people essentially-up and down, all the
way from up in Gastonia to Durham.... It is solely a piedmont district and you have
that community of interest rather than trying tot [sic] combine the rural east with the
piedmont.
260. PoPu.AToN An HousnGo CHA criusTIcs, supra note 258, at 17-18.
261. Id. at 45-46. The First District has the lowest. Id.
262. Id. at 39-40.
263. Id. at 41-42. It also apparently has the highest rate of AIDS cases among the North
Carolina congressional districts. Interview with Teresa Klimko, R.N., D.V.M., M.P.H., Epidemi-
ologist, HIV/STD Control Branch, N.C. Dept. of Environment, Health and Natural Resources
(Oct. 18, 1993). Similarly, the First District, which has also been questioned as a "ra-
cial-consideration" gerrymander, has the state's most rural and least dense population, PoPULA-
TION AND HoUsING CHARAcriPtsrics, supra note 258, at 17-18, 39-40, the highest percentage of
female residents, id. at 1-2, the lowest average owned housing-unit value, id. at 20-21, the lowest
average per capita income, id. at 45-46, the highest percentage of families living below poverty
level, id., and the highest percentage of people over the age of 25 without a high school education,
id. at 41-42.
264. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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society26 while simultaneously using such incendiary terms as "political
apartheid," '66 the Shaw Court not only does a great disservice to the cause
of voting rights, but also strikes a blow to a greater goal: the celebration of
diversity, not only within the governmental arena, but in the country as a
whole. In evaluating the North Carolina plan, the Court ignores the unfor-
tunate reality that the problems of racism remain all too readily apparent
throughout America. While the majority sees the type of districts North
Carolina and other states have drawn in an effort to promote truly "repre-
sentative" government and to rectify the discrimination that plagues the
United States as an effort to "segregate" voters, 67 the North Carolina plan
actually brings together voters with common interests, concerns, and exper-
iences. Such plans are well within the spirit of the Court's racial classifica-
tion and voting rights jurisprudence and should not unnecessarily fall victim
to an elusive inquiry with potentially undesirable effects. The irony of this
decision was not lost on Justice Blackmun, who observed that the major-
ity's newly invented claim came as a result of a "challenge by white voters
to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to
Congress for the first time since Reconstruction." '268 It will only compound
the irony if this decision serves to contribute to the deterioration of race
relations, thereby injuring all Americans.
RIPLEY EAGLES RAND
265. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
266. Id. at 2827.
267. See id. at 2826, 2832. Other districts that have been disputed as "racial-consideration"
gerrymanders include, among others, Louisiana's Fourth District, Georgia's Eleventh District,
Florida's Third District, Texas's Twenty-Ninth District and Illinois's Fourth District; Glasser,
supra note 40, at 18-19; Van Biema, supra note 12, at 30. On December 28, 1993, a Louisiana
district court, relying on Shaw, struck down the congressional districting plan for that state, con-
cluding that the plan was "undoubtedly a child of racial gerrymandering." Hays v. State of Loui-
siana, No. 92-CV-1522, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775, at *40 (W.D. La. Dec. 28, 1993).
268. Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). They are Representative Eva Clayton of the First
District and Representative Melvin Watt of the Twelfth District. Glasser, supra note 40, at 18.
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